A manufacturer writes supply contracts with N buyers. Then, the buyers invest in product development and marketing, and the manufacturer builds capacity. Finally, demand is realized, and the …rms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an e¢cient allocation of capacity among the buyers. The court remedy for breach of contract (speci…c performance versus expectation damages) a¤ects how the …rms share the gain from renegotiation, and hence how the …rms make investments ex ante. The objective is to design supply contracts that will induce the buyers and manufacturer to make the …rst best investments. When the manufacturer is dominant and the breach remedy is expectation damages, the …rst best is achieved with simple advance purchase contracts. In contrast, with a dominant manufacturer and speci…c performance, the …rst best may not be achieved. A "tradable options" clause is needed to increase buyers' incentive for investment. When the buyers have signi…cant bargaining power and the breach remedy is expectation damages, simple advance purchase contracts will always result in underinvestment in capacity and overinvestment in innovation by the buyers. However, if the separability condition proposed in Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) holds and the breach remedy is speci…c performance, then the …rst best is achieved with simple advance purchase contracts. Finally, building on Maskin and Moore (1999) we describe more complex contracts that induce the …rst best where simple advance purchase contracts fail.
Introduction
In high tech, …rms often renegotiate supply contracts in response to volatile market conditions, and rarely go to court to enforce the contracts (Cahn 2000, Serant and Ojo 2001) . Nevertheless, the remedy that a court would impose for unilateral breach of contract in ‡uences the …nancial outcome of any renegotiation. In designing supply contracts and making investments, managers need to anticipate renegotiation and understand recent trends in how courts enforce supply contracts.
We consider two remedies for breach of contract: expectation damages and speci…c performance. Although the former is routine in practice, almost all of the academic literature on supply contracts assumes the latter. The expectation damages remedy is that a …rm that breaches a contract must pay the injured …rm the money required to achieve the same pro…t as if the contract were executed. The alternative is that the court enforces performance of the speci…c terms of the contract. Expectation damages became routine in the U.S. in the late 19th century, motivated by the argument of Oliver Wendell Holmes that the remedy of expectation damages encourages a promisor to breach when the resulting pro…ts exceed the loss to the promisee, and is therefore socially e¢cient. Speci…c performance may be enforced at the discretion of the court for unique goods, for which no substitute exists. Recently, legal scholars have argued for routine availability of the speci…c performance remedy because (1) expectation damages are di¢cult for the court to measure and therefore often undercompensatory (e.g., when a supplier breaches a contract to deliver goods, the buyer is not compensated for managerial e¤ort expended in searching for an alternative);
(2) e¢cient breach would occur anyway under speci…c performance through renegotiation; and (3) with multiple potential buyers, the interference tort is used to indirectly (and ine¢ciently) enforce speci…c performance (Varadarajan 2001) .
Several economists have investigated how the breach remedy (expectation damages versus speci…c performances) in ‡uences relationship-speci…c investment between a buyer and manufacturer. In Shavel (1980) the …rms contract to trade a single unit at a …xed price, and cannot subsequently renegotiate the contract. The buyer makes an investment that increases the value of the item, and the manufacturer's production cost is uncertain. After the value of the item and the production cost are realized, expectation damages Pareto-dominates speci…c performance. Under expectation damages, the manufacturer breaches the contract when the production cost exceeds the value of the unit to the buyer, and pays the value of the unit to the buyer. However, although expectation damages results in e¢cient breach, it causes ine¢ciency in investment. Speci…cally, the buyer spends too much to increase the value of the item, because he is guaranteed to receive the value of the item, even when the manufacturer does not produce and deliver the item. Rogerson (1984) incorporates renegotiation into the model, and …nds that expectation damages results in overinvestment, and that speci…c performance Pareto dominates expectation damages. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) incorporate a variable production quantity, and …nd that the …rst best can be achieved with a contract that speci…es a …xed price and quantity, under expectation damages and speci…c performance. However, when the manufacturer also makes an investment that stochastically reduces his variable production cost, the optimal bilateral investments cannot be achieved under expectation damages, but can be achieved under speci…c performance if a separability condition holds. Alessi and Sta¤ (1994) observe that many …rms use relationships and reputation to enforce speci…c performance where courts will not. In summary, this economics literature suggests that the speci…c performance remedy is more e¤ective than expectation damages.
Partially in response to these academic insights, the speci…c performance remedy is becoming increasingly common in practice. The O¢cial Comment to the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code in Section 2-716 indicates that speci…c performance is increasingly used in supply contracts, specifically, "for output and requirements contracts involving a particular or peculiarly available source of supply, as contrasted with contracts for the sale of heirlooms or priceless works of art which were usually involved in the older cases." For example, speci…c performance of a contract for supply of commercial steel was enforced because the buyer was unable to buy steel on the market within a reasonable leadtime (Murray 1996) .
While the economics literature on breach remedy focuses on investments to reduce the cost of production and/or enhance the value of the product, the operations management literature on supply contracts examines investments in capacity. This second literature assumes that if a contract is enforceable, then the penalty for breach is speci…c performance, and this is termed "forced compliance." The opposite extreme where the contract is not enforceable is termed "voluntary compliance" (Cachon and Lariviere 2001) . Although these two extreme regimes have received signi…cant attention, Cachon states, "The compliance regime in reality almost surely falls somewhere in between those two extremes" (2003) . This paper aims to enrich this literature by considering expectation damages-an intermediate remedy which is routinely applied.
In a model motivated by contract manufacturing practices in the semiconductor and biopharmaceutical industries, we address the following questions: What types of supply contracts will induce optimal investments in innovation and capacity? Is the speci…c performance remedy truly more e¤ective than expectation damages?
Currently, biologics (protein-based therapeutics) manufacturing capacity is tightly con-strained. Because the lead time for building this manufacturing capacity is three to …ve years, this shortage is expected to last for at least …ve years (Molowa 2001) . Therefore, before making important investments in drug development and clinical trials, pharmaceutical giants like Eli Lilly and small biotechnology …rms are reserving capacity from the leading biologics manufacturer Lonza, and paying steep fees. The contracts stipulate: the start date (typically three years from the time of contracting) and the volume of fermentation capacity per week. Buyers make a transfer payment to Lonza at the time of contracting, which Lonza uses to defray the cost of building production capacity. Lonza carefully evaluates the drug(s) that the buyer has under development, assessing the likelihood that the drug will be successful in clinical trials, the size of the market for the drug, and the therapeutic dosage requirement (hence the volume of fermentation capacity that will be needed). At the time of contracting, the volume of fermentation capacity that the buyer will need is highly uncertain. Fortunately, Lonza's manufacturing facilities can readily be adapted to produce various proteins. When one buyer has greater demand than anticipated and another buyer has low demand (or zero demand, in the case that a drug fails its clinical trials), Lonza renegotiates the contracts with the buyers to achieve to achieve a more pro…table allocation of its …xed capacity (Thomas 2001). 1 Lonza is the sole source of supply for many small biotechnology …rms, and developing an alternative supplier would require FDA approval (two years). In this sense, the capacity is "unique", so a biotechnology …rms could …le for speci…c performance if Lonza failed to supply the reserved capacity.
In the semiconductor industry, in 1998, AMD contracted to provide capacity two years later to customers in a diverse set of market segments (e.g., Alcatel, Bosch, Cisco, Nokia). Contracts stipulated the number of wafer starts per week, and the price per wafer start. In addition, the buyers made transfer payments to AMD that enabled AMD to build production capacity just in time for the boom in demand in 2000. During the boom, AMD and its customers renegotiated the contracts to achieve the most pro…table allocation of scarce capacity. The boom of 2000 was followed a downturn in demand in almost all market segments in 2001. In the fall of 2001, AMD was operating at 40% utilization. AMD took Alcatel to court to force it to pay for the wafer starts for which it had contracted (Serant and Ojo 2001) . The court forced Alcatel to pay damages-the purchase price speci…ed in the contract less the variable production cost that AMD would have incurred in executing the contract. This demonstrated to AMD's other customers that the courts would impose expectation damages for breach of contract, and that AMD was willing to go to court 1 Regulatory concerns to ensure the availability of particular drugs sometimes constrain the degree of reallocation. if necessary. Then AMD renegotiated its contracts with other customers, allowing them to take less than the contractually speci…ed quantity. In some cases AMD's customers committed "design wins" (future production volume) to AMD, rather than pay damages (Doran 2001 ).
In our model, a manufacturer invests in capacity and N prospective buyers simultaneously invest in innovation (e.g. research and development, clinical trials, marketing). These innovation investments determine the joint distribution of demand functions for the products of the N buyers.
Each buyer must purchase capacity from the manufacturer to meet demand. After the buyers' demand functions are realized, the manufacturer's capacity is allocated so as to maximize the total pro…t. In the absence of enforceable contracts, each buyer anticipates that the manufacturer will expropriate some of the gains from his investment in innovation, and the manufacturer anticipates that the buyers will expropriate some of the gain from his investment in capacity. This "hold up problem" typically leads to underinvestment in capacity and innovation e¤ort (Plambeck and Taylor 2001) . Therefore the …rms should enter into supply contracts before they invest in capacity and innovation e¤ort.
The investments in innovation and capacity are noncontractible, and …rms cannot write complete contracts that specify the quantity for each buyer contingent on all the buyers' realized demand functions. Instead, the manufacturer will contract with each buyer i to supply a …xed quantity Q i to the buyer; under this advanced purchase contract, the buyer pays up-front for the quantity purchased. After demand is realized, the e¢cient allocation of capacity may di¤er from the contractual quantities. Then, the buyers and manufacturer renegotiate their contracts to achieve the e¢cient capacity allocation, and bargain over how to share the resulting gain in total pro…t.
Although the …rms settle outside of court, the outcome of the bargaining game, and hence the ex ante incentives for investment, depend upon the remedy that the courts would impose for breach of contract. Under the expectation damages remedy, the manufacturer can choose to supply less than Q i to buyer i and pay enough money to provide the same pro…t as buyer i would have had with the full quantity Q i . However, under the speci…c performance remedy, the court forces the …rms to do exactly what the contract speci…es: the manufacturer must provide the full quantity Q i . Hence, under speci…c performance, the manufacturer is constrained to build su¢cient capacity to meet his obligations to all of the buyers. In either case, the objective is to choose fQ i g i=1::N to induce the manufacturer and buyers to make investments that maximize expected pro…t of the total system. (Because the "pie" of expected pro…t can be shared through transfer payments at the time of contracting, the …rms should adopt contracts that maximize the pie.) Figure 1 the manufacturer has the power to extract all the gains from renegotiation and the remedy for breach is expectation damages, then the …rst best 2 investments can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium with advance purchase contracts. However, switching to the breach remedy of speci…c performance, we …nd that the …rst best may not be implementable, and the …rms invest in excess capacity but too little innovation. Then, giving the buyers the legal right to trade their capacity without approval from the manufacturer increases the incentive for innovation and results in strictly greater expected pro…t. (Such "tradable capacity options" are employed by semiconductor contract manufacturer TSMC.) In contrast, if the buyers extract some gain from renegotiation, then the …rst best cannot be implemented with advance purchase contracts. The …rms invest too little in capacity and too much in innovation, given the limited capacity. However, under the separability conditions proposed by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and with speci…c performance, the …rst best is implemented by setting Q i equal to the expected value of the optimal allocation of capacity to buyer i conditioned on the …rst best investments in capacity and innovation. Because the …rst best investments in capacity and innovation cannot always be implemented by simple advanced purchase contracts, we consider more general contracts. We propose "message" contracts (cf.
Maskin and Moore 1999) that will implement the …rst best investments in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. For brevity, we prove all these results under the assumption that the variable 2 "First best" refers to the investments that maximize total expected pro…t.
production cost is negligible compared to the initial cost of capacity. However, all the results hold when buyers bear the production cost (by paying an exercise price as in the semiconductor industry, or bearing responsibility for procurement and delivery of raw materials as in the biopharmaceutical industry). Two minor additional assumptions are required to extend Theorem 2 (the outcome under expectation damages when buyers have some bargaining power) to the setting with variable production costs; these are explained in §3.3.
Although in our presentation we tend to describe the remedy for breach as being determined by an outside party (the court), in principle, the …rms might be able to in ‡uence the remedy for breach. If the …rms operate in a jurisdiction where the contract may itself specify the remedy for breach, then our results provide guidance to …rms as to what remedy they should select. Figure   1 demonstrates how exogenous factors (e.g., the …rms' relative bargaining strengths) in ‡uence the remedy the …rms should choose.
Formulation
Consider a contract manufacturer with N prospective customers (buyers i = 1; :::; N). Figure   2 depicts the sequence of events. Each buyer i contracts with the manufacturer for Q i units of capacity. Then he invests in innovation (product development and marketing); the level of innovation is represented by a continuous decision variable e i 2 (0; 1). The buyer's cost of innovation is g i (e i ). We assume that the function g i (¢) is di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly convex, with
Together, the buyers' innovation e¤orts e= fe i g i=1::N 2 (0; 1) N induce a probability measure P e on a space -. Associated with each market state ! 2 -is a set of revenue functions fR i (q; !) : q¸0g i=1::N . The revenue generated by buyer i with q units of capacity is R i (q; !). We will assume that for every ! 2 -, the functions R i (q; !) are di¤erentiable, increasing and concave with R i (0; !) = 0. E e [] denotes expectation with respect to the probability measure P e determined by the buyers' innovation e¤orts e. All …rms are risk-neutral and share common information about costs and how innovation in ‡uences revenue.
While the buyers are investing in innovation, the manufacturer invests in capacity c¸0 at a cost of k per unit. The capacity c can be used to serve any of the N buyers. Under the speci…c performance remedy, the manufacturer must build su¢cient capacity to meet his obligations: The …rms share the same information regarding the costs of capacity and innovation, and how innovation in ‡uences revenue. It is natural to assume that capacity and innovation e¤ort are complements:
if P e (q 0¸q ) = 1 and P e (q 0 > q) > 0; then
the main results continue to hold when this assumption is relaxed, as discussed in §3.3.
After the buyers invest in innovation and the manufacturer invests in capacity, the market state ! and the consequent revenue functions fR i g i=1::N are realized. Prior to production, the …rms observe the market state and the manufacturer's capacity. Let fq
N denote an e¢cient allocation of capacity for each buyer, obtained by solving
If q ¤ i (c) 6 = Q i for some buyer i, the manufacturer must renegotiate the advance purchase contracts to achieve the e¢cient allocation. The increase in total revenue from allocating capacity e¢ciently, rather than according to the advance contracts
The manufacturer and buyers bargain over how to share this gain in revenue. The bargaining outcome fx i (c; Q 1;::: Q N ; !)g i=1::N speci…es the share for each buyer i, i = 1::N; as a function of the available capacity, the contract terms fQ i g i=1::N , as well as the probabilistic outcome ! which determines the revenue functions. Furthermore, we assume that the bargaining leads to the optimal capacity allocation, so that the manufacturer's share is §
We require that each …rm must bene…t from the bargaining, so
In contrast to speci…c performance, under the expectation damages remedy, the manufacturer is not constrained to choose capacity c¸ § N i=1 Q i ; the manufacturer can unilaterally choose to deliver any q · Q i to buyer i and pay
in compensation to buyer i. Again, the …rms will renegotiate to an e¢cient allocation. Each buyer i; in addition to receiving her court-enforced revenue of R i (Q i ); receives x i ; the manufacturer's share is again given by (3). Because the manufacturer can unilaterally deliver less than a buyer orders, the manufacturer's share is bounded below by
Henceforth we will assume that in making capacity and innovation e¤orts, the buyers and manufacturer anticipate the bargaining outcome fx i (c; Q 1;::: Q N ; !)g i=1::N . This assumption does not imply that ex ante the …rms must be able to predict exactly how the bargaining will proceed.
Prior to making their innovation and capacity investments, the …rms may have considerable uncer-tainty regarding the outcome of the bargaining. To see that the formulation captures this, observe that two states ! 1 and ! 2 may result in identical revenue functions and di¤er only in terms of how the bargaining will proceed. We only assume that the state of the world resolves this uncertainty.
For brevity, when the set of contracts is …xed, we will write x i (c) for x i (c; Q 1;::: Q N ; !).
Although we have described the model as requiring that all the uncertainty about the market conditions be resolved prior to renegotiation, the formulation is ‡exible enough to allow for residual uncertainty. If production lead times are su¢ciently long and the buyers' products are distinct, then it is likely there will continue to exist some uncertainty in market conditions at the point when …rms must renegotiate the allocation of capacity. This is captured within the current formulation when the revenue functions fR i (q; !)g i=1::N are interpreted as giving the expected revenue from q units of capacity at the time of contract renegotiation.
¤ is strictly jointly concave and continuously di¤erentiable in e and c, so there exists a unique optimal capacity investment and vector of innovation e¤orts which maximize total expected pro…t:
We will also assume that the optimal capacity and innovation are strictly positive: c ¤ > 0 and e ¤ i > 0 for i = 1::N. For each buyer in isolation, we will assume that E e [R i (Q)] is di¤erentiable and concave as a function of e i .
For a given set of supply contracts fQ i g i=1::N , each …rm chooses an investment level which maximizes its own expected pro…t. If the manufacturer anticipates innovation e¤ort from the buyers of e, his optimal capacity investment is the solution to
where c = § N i=1 Q i under speci…c performance and c = 0 under expectation damages. If buyer i anticipates capacity c and innovation e¤ort from the other buyers of e ¡i , he will choose investment e¤ort according to
The problem for the manufacturer and buyers is to design a set of contracts fQ i g i=1::N that implement the …rst best investment decisions (e ¤ ; c ¤ ) as a Nash equilibrium. (The parties can allocate this total expected pro…t through transfer payments at the time of contracting.) We will identify conditions under which the …rst best can and cannot be achieved. In the latter case, the …rms should coordinate on the second best contracts fQ i g i=1::N and associated Nash equilibrium (ẽ;c) which maximize total expected pro…t.
Observe that the speci…c performance and expectation damages remedies impose di¤erent informational requirements for the court. Under expectation damages, the court must be able to estimate the monetary cost of the damages in ‡icted on a buyer by the manufacturer's breach of contract in an unbiased fashion. Under speci…c performance, the court only need observe whether the manufacturer delivered the contractually speci…ed quantity.
Results
With only one buyer, under the speci…c performance or expectation damages remedy, the design problem is straightforward. 
because the buyer takes a nonnegative share of the gain from bargaining x 1 (c)¸0. Under expectation damages (but not speci…c performance), the manufacturer may build c < c
Therefore, under expectation damages or speci…c performance, choosing c = c ¤ is a best response for the manufacturer.
This parallels the …nding by Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) that the …rst best is achieved when the manufacturer's investment reduces the cost of production, and the manufacturer has the right but not the obligation to deliver a …xed quantity to the buyer.
Manufacturer Dominant

Advanced Purchase Contracts
In many instances in the biologics and semiconductor industries, the manufacturer dominates bargaining over ex post capacity allocation. This motivates us to examine the special case in which the manufacturer has all the bargaining power (x i = 0 for i = 1::N). It is natural to assume that, as the buyers compete for capacity, innovation e¤orts are substitutes; for i 6 = j
The main result of this subsection, that the expectation damages remedy is superior when the manufacturer is dominant, holds regardless of whether (6) holds.
The next theorem establishes that the …rst best is always achieved under expectation damages, but is not always achieved under speci…c performance. Under speci…c performance, the second best contracts result in overinvestment in capacity, but each buyer's e¤ort level is lower than optimal, given the available capacity and e¤orts of the other buyers. To state the theorem, we must de…ne the following benchmarks; the optimal capacity contingent on buyers' e¤ort levels is
and the optimal innovation e¤ort for buyer i contingent on the capacity and other buyer's innovation e¤orts is e ¤ i (c; e ¡i ) = arg max
Furthermore,Q i is the unique solution to
Interestingly, the …rst best optimal contracts coincide under expectation damages and speci…c
Theorem 1 Suppose that the manufacturer has all the bargaining power. Under expectation damages, the …rst best investment levels are implemented as a Nash equilibrium with contracts fQ i g i=1::N :
Under speci…c performance, the …rst best investment levels are implemented as a Nash equilibrium
If (8) is not satis…ed, then under speci…c performance, the …rst best cannot be achieved with advanced purchase contracts; further, any second best set of contracts fQ i g i=1::N and associated Nash equilibrium (ẽ;c) is characterized by overinvestment in capacity and underinvestment in innovation:
Proof: Let us …rst assume the speci…c performance remedy, and then assume expectation damages.
Speci…c Performance: The manufacturer's optimization problem when he has all the bargaining power becomes
and because R i (Q i ) does not depend on the capacity investment c, the manufacturer's optimization problem reduces to
she will choose the optimal capacity if the contracted capacity is not too large, that is,
Furthermore, given contract Q i and assuming optimal e¤ort from the other buyers, buyer i's optimization problem is
The objective is strictly concave in e i . Hence buyer i's best response is e (8) is satis…ed. Now let us suppose that (8) is not satis…ed, so the …rst best cannot be achieved. We will …rst prove (10), and then prove (9). The argument is by contradiction. Suppose thatê i > e ¤ (c;ẽ ¡i )
That is, reducing the capacity allocated to buyer i reduces his e¤ort to the optimal level e ¤ i (c;ẽ ¡i ), assuming …xed e¤ort from the other buyers. By assumption, the buyers' e¤ort levels are substitutes, so a reduction in e¤ort for buyer i increases the incentive for e¤ort for every other buyer j. Hence for every other buyer j 6 = i there exists
By reducing the capacity allocated to buyer j we maintain his e¤ort at levelê j . If the manufacturer's capacity were …xed atc, adopting contracts n Q 0 j o j=1::N ; to reduce the e¤ort for buyer i to e ¤ (c;ẽ ¡i ) and maintain the e¤ort from all other buyers atê j ; would result in strictly greater expected pro…t.
j , so the manufacturer will choose capacity of
which yields even greater expected pro…t than under the original set of contracts nQ 
we could increaseQ i , and thus increase the innovation e¤ort from buyer i to achieve strictly greater expected pro…t.) The …rst best is not achieved, so we must have eitherc > c ¤ orc < c ¤ : Capacity and e¤ort are complements, sõ c > c ¤ would imply thatê i > e ¤ i for some buyer i: But then, as above, we could reduce the capacity allocated buyer i to achieve strictly greater expected pro…t. Similarly,c < c ¤ would imply that e i < e ¤ i for some buyer i; and that we could increase the capacity allocated buyer i to achieve strictly greater expected pro…t. This contradicts our assumption that nQ Therefore, given innovation e¤ort from the other buyers of e ¤ ¡i , his e¤ort problem is to
By construction ofQ i in (7) this coincides with the integrated optimization problem, so buyer i's best response is e ¤ i . Given that the buyers invest optimally, the manufacturer chooses capacity to maximize his expected pro…t:
Note that R i (Q i ) does not depend on the available capacity, so the best response of the manufacturer is to build capacity c ¤ .
Because a dominant manufacturer appropriates all the gains from renegotiation, the buyers' e¤ort levels are independent of the manufacturer's capacity decision. A further consequence is that the the manufacturer will respond to e¢cient innovation investments e ¤ by building the e¢cient capacity c ¤ , unless the remedy for breach forces him to do otherwise. The expectation damages remedy will never require this, and consequently, the contracts fQ i g i=1::N ; which provide incentives for e¢cient innovation, always achieve the …rst best. In contrast, the sharper bite of the speci…c performance remedy will force the manufacturer to build more than the e¢cient capacity when the total contracted quantity is su¢ciently large (which occurs when (8) is violated), distorting the investment decisions away from the …rst best. Under speci…c performance, the contract designer faces a dilema: On the one hand, providing incentives for e¤ort requires relatively large quantity commitments. On the other hand, large quantity commitments, enforced by the coercive speci…c performance remedy, compel the manufacturer to overinvest in capacity. The second best contract re ‡ects this tradeo¤: the contract leads to overinvestment in capacity and underinvestment in e¤ort.
The e¤ectiveness of advance purchase contracts in achieving the …rst best under speci…c performance depends critically on whether (8) (8) holds if and only if, at the …rst best levels of capacity and e¤ort, incremental e¤ort is more valuable to an individual buyer than the integrated system:
(8) and (11) may be violated (so the …rst best is not achieved) when innovation e¤ort has positive externalities on other buyers:
Positive externalities to research and development e¤ort exist when buying …rms are able to use innovations developed by other …rms.
This may occur either if intellectual property protections are weak, so that there is R&D "leakage,"
or if innovating …rms agree to share innovations through technology licensing. Positive externalities to marketing e¤ort exist when e¤ort by one …rm increases customer "awareness," which bene…ts other …rms. (Conversely, negative externalities will exist when innovation e¤ort dynamics are instead competitive. For example, marketing e¤ort by one …rm may convince customers that other …rms products are of lower value; R&D e¤orts by one …rm which lead to patentable discoveries may reduce the value of other …rms' R&D e¤orts.)
To summarize, advance purchase contracts will tend to fail to achieve the …rst best under speci…c performance when innovation e¤ort has signi…cant positive externalities. However, advance purchase contracts may fail to achieve the …rst best even when no such externalities exist. To see this, consider a simple, two-buyer model where innovation e¤ort has no direct impact on the other buyer's revenue:
(M i ¡ s)s; and the market size M i is a random variable that takes value H with probability e i and takes value L < H with probability (1 ¡ e i ). This model is motivated by the pharmaceutical industry where products either succeed or fail in passing clinical trials. As before, suppose that the …rst best innovation levels are symmetric (see Plambeck and Taylor (2003) for su¢cient conditions for symmetry). (8) holds if and only if e ¤ i < 1=2: To see the intuition, observe that the integrated system's revenue is increased by reallocating units only when the buyers face di¤erent market sizes. Incremental e¤ort is more valuable to the integrated system when e¤ort is small because it increases the probability that the the buyers will face di¤erent market sizes. Thus, in the context of this model, we conclude that advance purchase contracts will fail to achieve the …rst best under speci…c performance when capacity and innovation e¤ort are costly. (For a more thorough discussion of these and related issues see Plambeck and Taylor (2003) .)
Tradable Options
Theorem 1 establishes that in settings with § N i=1Q i > c ¤ , under the speci…c performance remedy, the …rst best cannot be achieved with advance purchase contracts . This raises the question: could more complex contracts yield greater total expected pro…t? Given that the state of the market ! is noncontractible, the most obvious candidate is a contract in which buyer i pays an initial fee to reserve capacity Q i and then, after observing the state of the market, pays an exercise price p i (q) that increases with the actual production quantity q 2 [0; Q i ]. Because innovation and capacity are complements, the optimal production quantity q
increasing in the innovation e¤ort e i . With this observation, it is straightforward to prove that imposing an exercise price reduces the buyer's incentive for e¤ort, and hence results in strictly lower total expected pro…t than can be achieved with simple advance purchase contracts (the proof is given in the internet appendix). Therefore the exercise price should be zero. Alternatively, the manufacturer could write advance purchase contracts that give buyers the right to trade capacity and retain all the gains from trade. Such contracts are commonly called "tradable options," and are used by the giant semiconductor contract manufacturer TSMC. Giving the buyers the right to trade capacity essentially transfers bargaining power from the manufacturer to the buyers. The next proposition shows this can be bene…cial (under speci…c performance).
To demonstrate the value of tradable options, we will consider a simpli…ed example with two buyers. When there are two …rms, it is generally accepted that the …rms will split the gains from cooperation 50:50 (Nash 1953 , Rubinstein 1982 , Kagel and Roth 1995 . Thus, assuming N = 2 facilitates identifying a natural bargaining outcome. In addition, we will assume that the buyers have independent revenue functions. Speci…cally, buyer i's revenue function R i is independent of e j and R j for i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i:
The manufacturer sells tradable options © Q Q t i to the buyers and keep the associated gains from trade. Under expectation damages, the manufacturer may choose to build c < § i=1;2 Q t i and compensate the buyers …nancially for the shortage. The bargaining outcome is symmetric for the buyers:
and the manufacturer's share is § i=1;2
Note that this is negative if, under expectation damages, c < § i=1;2 Q t i . Therefore, given innovation e¤ort from the buyers of (e 1 ; e 2 ), the manufacturer will choose capacity to
where c = §Q T i under speci…c performance and c = 0 under expectation damages. Buyer 1 chooses his e¤ort according to
and buyer 2 faces the symmetric optimization problem.
The following theorem establishes that the …rst best is achieved with tradable options if and only if the …rst best is achieved under advanced purchase contracts. In the case in which the …rst best is achieved, the proof demonstrates that the optimal number of tradable options is smaller than the optimal advanced purchase contract quantity. When the …rst best is not achieved with advanced purchase contracts, tradable options result in greater expected pro…t.
Theorem 2 Under expectation damages, the …rst best can be implemented with tradable options.
Under speci…c performance, the …rst best can be implemented with tradable options if and only if (8) is satis…ed; the second best expected pro…t with tradable options is greater than with simple advanced purchase contracts.
Proof: The buyers have independent revenue functions, so buyer 1's objective function reduces to
Similarly, buyer 2's objective function is
Each buyer i's objective function is concave so …rst order conditions are su¢cient for optimality.
We will construct a set of tradable options
and, if (8) 
Then it follows that under expectation damages and also, if (8) is satis…ed, under speci…c performance, that (e ¤ ; c ¤ ) is implemented as a Nash equilibrium with tradable options
¾ : 
because c ¤ ¡ Q t 2 (¿)¸Q 1 . Also observe that at Q = 0;
¸increases continuously with Q, we conclude that Q t 1 (¿) is exists and satis…es
At the other extreme of
We conclude that there exists and corresponding equilibrium (ẽ;c), that for i = 1; 2
We also know thatQ
Therefore, keeping the same capacityQ i for each buyer but making it tradable, i.e. selling Q t i =Q i tradable options to each buyer, will increase each buyer's incentive for e¤ort:
If (17) is satis…ed with equality for i = 1; 2 then (ẽ;c) remains an equilibrium with tradable options
Otherwise we can reduce the capacity for each buyer to Q t0 i <Q i to satisfy
If c ¤ (ẽ) <c = §Q i this enables the manufacturer to reduce her capacity investment, strictly increasing the total expected pro…t, with equilibrium (ẽ; c
c) is an equilibrium with tradable options
3.2 Manufacturer Not Dominant
Advance Purchase Contracts
In this section we consider the case where the buyers have some bargaining power vis a vis the manufacturer. We will show that under conditions proposed by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) the …rst best can be achieved with speci…c performance. However, for very general conditions, the …rst best cannot be achieved under expectation damages. In particular, the expectation damages results in underinvestment in capacity and/or overinvestment in innovation.
Speci…c Performance
Following Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and with a slight abuse of notation, the revenue functions are separable if
where µ is a random variable.
3 Also, the bargaining outcome is linear if each buyer i obtains a fraction ® i 2 [0; 1] of the gain from reallocating capacity:
# For instance, the Nash bargaining solution is linear with ® i = 1 N +1 for i = 1::N. One might interpret the revenue function (19) as a second-order approximation to the "true" revenue function. In that sense, the next theorem provides an approximate solution to the problem of designing advance purchase contracts that will induce the maximum total expected pro…t. Each buyer commits to purchase a quantity equal to his expected optimal quantity allocation given optimal investments in innovation and capacity. 
¤ ; e ¤ ; µ)] for i = 1::N the …rst best investment levels (e ¤ ; c ¤ ) constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: De…ne 
3 In Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) the buyer's revenue Ri(q; e; µ) is determined directly by the quantity q, the buyer's speci…c investment e, and a random variable µ. This formulation is subsumed in ours, as follows. Suppose that the random variable µ is de…ned on probability space -0 by probability measure ¹ µ . De…ne -= -0 £ (0; 1) N and for any element ! = (! 0 ; e 0 ) 2 -; Ri (q; !) = Ri(q; e 0 ; µ(! 0 )) and ¹ e (!) = 1(e = e 0 )¹ µ (! 0 ):
By the envelope theorem,
Given investment by the other buyers of e ¤ ¡i and manufacturer capacity of c ¤ ; and advance purchase quantity Q i , buyer i chooses his investment in innovation e i according to
For j 6 = i, R j (Q j ; (e i ; e ¤ ¡i ); µ) is invariant with respect to e i , so (21) reduces to
Because R c i (e i ; µ) is strictly concave in e i , the unique optimal investment by buyer i is the value of e i that satis…es
is uniformly bounded on the support of µ justi…es the interchange of expectation and di¤erentiation, so
Therefore buyer i will choose the …rst best investment level e ¤ i . Finally, we know from (20) 
Under speci…c performance, the manufacturer must build capacity of at least c ¤ . The manufacturer will not build more than c ¤ because he would share the increase in revenue with the buyers:
E[x i (c; Q 1 ; :::; Q N ; µ)] increases with c. Therefore (e ¤ ; c ¤ ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Expectation Damages
The assumption that each buyer's share is proportional to the total gain from renegotiation is satis…ed by the Nash bargaining solution. However, this assumption does not hold for other plausible solutions to the bargaining game. In practice, according to Brandenburger and Nalebu¤ (1996) , a buyer's share x i is limited by the value that he adds to the bargaining game (the "added value principle.") More speci…cally, the bargaining outcome for a buyer may depend on the value that he adds to every possible coalition of the buyers and manufacturer. The value added by buyer j to a coalition consisting of the manufacturer and a subset S ½ f1::Ngnj of the other buyers is, under expectation damages,
( 22) and under speci…c performance
The best-known normative solution concept in cooperative game theory is the Shapley value: 
In contrast, under speci…c performance, (24) may be violated.
Proof: For brevity of notation, we will suppress the sample path !. For S ½ f1::Ng de…ne 
Because the revenue functions are strictly concave and increasing, for any S ½ f1::Ngnj
From (26), for i 2 S, @¦
which establishes (24). By repeated application of (26),.q
> Q j and from (27), for i 2 S,
This establishes (25).
Finally, we show by example that under speci…c performance (24) may be violated. Suppose that N = 2 and the buyers have independent and identical revenue functions:
( 3 ln(1 + q) with probability e i ln(1 + q) with probability 1 ¡ e i for i = 1; 2. Let c = 2 and (Q 1 ; Q 2 ) = (1; 1). Then with probability (1 ¡ e 1 ) ¢ e 2 an e¢cient capacity allocation is q 
In particular, Lemma 1 guarantees that the Shapley value satis…es (28) under expectation damages, but not necessarily under speci…c performance. The Nash bargaining solution also satis…es (28) under expectation damages. Indeed, we believe that any plausible bargaining solution under expectation damages must satisfy (28).
The next lemma establishes a related property of the bargaining solution.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the probability measures P e are absolutely continuous: for any set A 2 -and e 2 (0; 1) N such that P e (A) = 0; we have P e 0 (A) = 0 for all e 0 2 (0; 1) N : Alternatively, suppose that the revenue functions are separable. Then under expectation damages,
Proof: Suppose that P e (q ¤ i (c) · Q i for i = 1::N) = 1 and the remedy for breach is expectation damages. Then as assumed in (3)- (5), the manufacturer expropriates all the gain from reallocating capacity P e (x i = 0 for i = 1::N) = 1:
If the probability measures induced by e 2 (0; 1) N are absolutely continuous, (30) holds for all e 2 (0; 1)
Alternatively, if the revenue functions are separable, then (31) follows immediately from (3)- (5) and the envelope theorem.
Recall that under expectation damages, if the manufacturer has all the bargaining power then the …rst best is achieved. Surprisingly, the converse is also true. For any system in which innovation e¤ort by one buyer does not create a positive externality for others:
the …rst best is achieved only if the manufacturer has all the bargaining power. Otherwise, the second best is characterized by underinvestment in capacity. This parallels the result in Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) for a system with one buyer and a manufacturer that has a stochastic, increasing variable cost of production but unlimited capacity.
Theorem 4 Suppose that the remedy for breach is expectation damages, (28), (29), (2) and (32) are satis…ed. Then the …rst best investments cannot be implemented as a Nash equilibrium under simple advance purchase contracts. For any set of advance purchase contracts nQ i o i=1::N and corresponding Nash equilibrium (ẽ;c), at least one of the following conditions must be satis…ed:
Proof: By de…nition, c ¤ (ẽ) is the optimal capacity given innovation levelsẽ, and satis…es the …rst
Recall that the total expected revenue
is strictly concave as a function of c, so for any c > c
The manufacturer's best responsec must satisfy the …rst order condition: eitherc = 0 or
Together, (28) and (34) imply that for c > c
This establishes that the manufacturer weakly underinvests in capacitỹ
Now let us assume thatc
and for some some k 2 1::N
(Recall that P e ¤ (q ¤ k (c ¤ ) =Q k ) < 1 for some k 2 1::N.) To complete the proof, it is su¢cient to show thatê k > e ¤ k (c;ẽ ¡k ): Becausec is optimal for the whole system and for the manufacturer,
so that
Then (28) implies that
Then from (29),
and from conditions (2) and (32),
Becauseê k satis…es the buyer's …rst order condition
and e ¤ k (c;ẽ ¡k ) satis…es the …rst order optimality condition for the whole system
we conclude thatê
Therefore, the …rst best investment levels cannot be implemented as a Nash equilibrium under simple advance purchase contracts.
The setting with expectation damages is characterized by underinvestment in capacity and overinvestment in innovation. In contrast, with speci…c performance, we often have overinvestment in capacity. Recall that under speci…c performance, the contract places a lower bound on the manufacturer's capacity; pushing up the manufacturer's capacity increases the buyer's incentive for e¤ort and thus improves system performance. In Plambeck and Taylor (2003), we derive optimal quantity ‡exibility contracts in a simple model with two buyers. For each buyer i, R i (q) = max
and the market size M i is a random variable that takes a high value H with probability e i and takes a low value L with probability (1 ¡ e i ): The market sizes M 1 and M 2 are independent. Renegotiation occurs in the event that one buyer has market size H and the other L, and the gain from bargaining x i is 25% of the "added value" for buyer i, the increase in total expected pro…t from his participation in capacity reallocation. For the case with k = 16; H = 80; L = 20; and g i (e) = 4000(log(1=(1 ¡ e))¡ e), simple advance purchase contracts are optimal, the order quantity for each buyer is Q i = 8, and the manufacturer does not speculate:c = 16. Each buyer exerts innovation e¤ortê i = 0:12: The optimal system capacity given this level of innovation e¤ort is only c ¤ (0:12; 0:12) = 14:4: So, in this example, capacity is in ‡ated by 11% to create incentives for innovation e¤ort.
Message Contracts
In previous sections we restricted attention to contracts having speci…c forms (e.g., advanced purchase, tradable options). An important insight is that such contracts fail to achieve the …rst best in a variety of circumstances. The purpose of this section is to examine the extent to which more general contracts can overcome this failure. (Because simple advanced purchase contracts guarantee that the …rst best is always achieved when there is N = 1 buyer, this section focuses on the case of N¸2.) Figure 3 depicts the sequence of events. We continue to assume that …rms adopt a contract prior to making investments in capacity and innovation. As before, the manufacturer's capacity c and the market state ! are not veri…able, so the contract cannot be directly contingent on (c; !): However, because the …rms observe (c; !) prior to the execution of the contract, it is natural to consider contracts that attempt to utilize the …rms' knowledge. Although the contract cannot be directly contingent on (c; !); the contract can be contingent on reports or messages from the …rms.
An example of a message contract is the following: After observing market conditions, each buyer orders from the manufacturer; the buyer's requested order quantity is her message. If the manufacturer's capacity is adequate to …ll all of the orders, the manufacturer allocates her capacity to do so. If the manufacturer does not have enough capacity to …ll all the orders, then the manufacturer allocates her capacity according to a pre-announced allocation rule. For example, the allocation rule may state that the limited capacity be rationed so that each buyer receives a quantity proportional to her order size (see Cachon and Lariviere (1999) for a discussion of this and other allocation rules). The amount that each buyer pays the manufacturer is a function of the quantity she receives and a pre-announced payment function.
In general, a contract can be understood as a game form or mechanism: A contract speci…es the structure for the …rms' interactions and speci…es, as a function of the …rms' messages, the quantities allocated to buyers and the transfer payments among the …rms. If the contract leads to an ine¢cient quantity allocation, the …rms will renegotiate to an e¢cient allocation. The outcome of the bargaining over the gains from renegotiation is as speci…ed in §2.
As before, the problem for the manufacturer and buyers is to design a contract that leads to favorable equilibrium innovation and capacity investments. Thus far we have assumed that if there exist multiple investment equilibria under a contract, the …rms will coordinate on the one that maximizes total expected pro…t. Although this may be natural, it is desirable to relax this assumption. Ideally, a contract would ensure that the equilibrium investment decisions are unique and are given by the …rst best investment levels (e ¤ ; c ¤ ). Theorem 5 demonstrates that such a contract exists, provided that four additional assumptions are satis…ed. 
Then there exists a message contract such that under the contract the …rst best investment levels (e ¤ ; c ¤ ) are implemented in the …rst stage of the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Because R i (q; !) is increasing and strictly concave, fq
:N is unique and R i (q; !) is strictly increasing for all i = 1::N and all ! 2 -. It is helpful to introduce two de…nitions.
An allotment is a function
that maps from a state (c; !) to a postrenegotiation set of quantities and transfer payments (fq i g i=1::N ; ft i g i=1::N ); q i is the quantity for buyer i; and t i is the net transfer payment from buyer i to the manufacturer (the transfer payment may be negative, indicating that the payment is from the manufacturer to the buyer). De…ne
where
The proof proceeds in two parts. First, consider the messaging subgame; we will establish that there exists a message contract such that under the contract, the subgame perfect equilibrium allotment is unique and is given by A ¤ . Second, consider the …rst stage in the game as a whole wherein the …rms make capacity and innovation investments; we will establish that if the subgame perfect equilibrium allotment is unique and is given by A ¤ ; then the …rst best investment levels (e ¤ ; c ¤ ) are implemented in the …rst stage of the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
We begin by showing the later result …rst. Under expectation damages, for the manufacturer, building capacity c ¤ strictly dominates building any other level of capacity. To see this, note that if the manufacturer anticipates innovation e¤ort from the buyers of e, his optimal capacity investment is the solution to
where T i (c; !) denotes the ith element of the transfer payment vector of the allotment A ¤ : Observe that for any e 2 (0; 1)
Thus, in any equilibrium, the manufacturer will build capacity c 
the …rst order necessary conditions for the equilibrium e¤ort levels are
Because
] is strictly concave in e and c; there exists a solution to (43), it is unique and is given by e ¤ : Thus, we have shown that if the subgame perfect equilibrium allotment is unique and is given by A ¤ ; then the …rst best investment levels (e ¤ ; c ¤ ) are implemented in the …rst stage of the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
We now proceed to show that there exists a message contract such that under the contract, the subgame perfect equilibrium allotment is unique and is given by A ¤ : We refer to a quantity and transfer payment vector pair (fq i g i=1::N ; ft i g i=1::N ) as an assignment. It is useful to de…ne a function H that describes the outcome of the renegotiation process. The renegotiation function
:N ) and state
Given the description in §2 of the outcome of the renegotiation, the function is de…ned as
From Theorem 4 of Maskin and Moore (1999) , the following are su¢cient conditions that ensure that there exists a message contract such that under the contract, the subgame perfect equilibrium allotment is unique and is given by A ¤ .
(I) there exists a function A(¢; ¢) :
for any …rm (that is, for each i 2 f1; ::; N + 1g there exists some assignment
(III) no assignment in R +N £ R N is maximal for two or more agents; and Expectation Damages: If c 1 6 = c 2 ; then because R i (q; !) is strictly increasing,
Observe that H(A(c 1 ; ! 1 ); (c 2 ; ! 2 )) 6 = A ¤ (c 2 ; ! 2 ) implies that one of the following sets of conditions holds:
! 2 ); ! 2 ) for some i 2 f1; ::Ng:
Suppose that (44) holds. The assignments
have the property that every buyer is indi¤erent between B and C in state (c 1 ; ! 1 ): It remains to show that some buyer k strictly prefers C to B in state (c 2 ; ! 2 ); that is
If (46) does not hold for all the buyers, then
Because q ¤ (c; !) is unique and the manufacturer has some bargaining power, the left hand side of (47) is strictly positive and the right hand side of (47) 
De…ne assignments B and C as
where with mild abuse of notation Q i (B) denotes the ith element of the quantity vector and
denotes the ith element of the transfer payment vector of the assignment B. Buyer k is indi¤erent between B and C in state (c ¤ ; ! 1 ): To see this, observe that buyer k's pro…t under C is
where the equality holds by assumption (iii). However, in state (c ¤ ; ! 2 ); buyer k strictly prefers C to B: To see this, observe that buyer
Thus, (IV) holds.
Speci…c Performance: The argument that establishes that (IV) holds under expectation damages extends to speci…c performance for all (c 1 ; ! 1 ); (c 2 ; ! 2 ) such that c 1 = c 2 : It remains to
show that (IV) holds for all (c 1 ; ! 1 ); (c 2 ; ! 2 ) such that c 1 6 = c 2 : Without loss of generality assume that c 1 > c 2 : The allocations
have the property that manufacturer is indi¤erent between B and C in state (c 1 ; ! 1 ): However, in state (c 2 ; w 2 ); the manufacturer strictly prefers C: To see this, observe that under B, the manufacturer's capacity is not su¢cient to meet the buyers' orders: c 2 < § N i=1 q i (c 1 ; ! 1 ); and consequently the buyer's pro…t is ¡1: This completes the proof.
A messaging contract overcomes the potential failure of simpler advanced purchase contracts in maximizing the total system pro…t, provided that the conditions in the Theorem are satis…ed.
The meaning of the …rst two conditions is straightforward. The third condition states that if the renegotiation involves only a single buyer and the manufacturer, then the bargaining outcome has the two …rms splitting the gain from renegotiation according to a deterministic fraction. The fourth condition is a mild, technical restriction that requires that the expected revenue generated by …nite capacity be …nite.
The manufacturer's investment in capacity and the buyers' investments in innovation depend on the post-renegotiation payo¤s that the …rms anticipate from the message subgame. The payo¤s result from a speci…c quantity allocation and set of transfer payments, which we collectively refer to as an allotment. In the messaging subgame, for any given message contract and state (c; !), there may exist multiple equilibria, no equilibrium, or a single equilibrium. The proof of Theorem 5 is accomplished in two steps. First, we identify, for any state (c; !); an allotment such that given these payo¤s, the …rst best investment levels (e ¤ ; c ¤ ) are the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, we demonstrate that there exists a two-stage contract such that for any state (c; !), the desired allotment constitute the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the messaging subgame. The second step employs Maskin and Moore (1999) , who develop su¢cient conditions that ensure for any speci…ed allotment, there exists a contract such that under the contract, this allotment is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Maskin and Moore show, by construction, that if these conditions are satis…ed, the desired result obtains. The proof of Theorem 5 relies on showing that these conditions are satis…ed for the desired allotment in our context.
It is useful to point out some characteristics of the contract that results in the …rst best investment levels. The contract, which is a special case of the contract constructed by Maskin and Moore, has two stages. In the …rst stage, each …rm reports the state of the world. If the reports coincide, then the contract allocates the capacity optimally, given those reports; further, the contracted transfer payments reward the manufacturer when the reported capacity is c ¤ and penalize the manufacturer otherwise; …nally, the transfer payments are constructed so that, given the reports, each buyer internalizes the externality that her e¤ort imposes on other buyers. If the reports are not consistent, the contract essentially has a suitably chosen …rm determine the assignment of quantities and transfer payments among the …rms. In the unique equilibrium, each …rm truthfully reports the state of the world and the contract allocates the capacity optimally;
consequently, no renegotiation occurs on the equilibrium path. A weakness of the contract is that it is not robust to collusion among the …rms.
Previous sections have demonstrated that simple contracts fail to achieve the …rst best in a variety of circumstances. For example, if the manufacturer does not have all the bargaining power, advanced purchase contracts fail to achieve the …rst best under expectation damages and achieve the …rst best under speci…c performance only under special conditions. The implication of Theorem 5 is that in these circumstances, the …rms can overcome this failure by employing a more complex message contract. This contract has the virtue of allowing quantities and payments to be contingent on reports of what the …rms have observed, thus obviating the need for renegotiation. However, this type of contracts will typically be more di¢cult to implement. An advanced purchase contract has the virtue of only involving the manufacturer and a single buyer. The message contract suggested in this section requires that the manufacturer and all N buyers commonly adopt a somewhat complex contract. When the number of buyers is large, this may be impractical.
Extensions
In practice, the variable cost of production may be signi…cant. Then, typically, the buyer is obligated to pay the variable cost of production through a positive exercise price for capacity and/or by purchasing and arranging for the delivery of raw materials to the manufacturer (Thomas 2001) .
Let p i (q) denote the total production cost as a function of the production quantity q for buyer i.
Then the contribution for buyer i from capacity Q is
Suppose that p i (¢) is convex. Then, for each ! 2 -, contribution C i (¢; !) is concave and nondecreasing, and there exists Q i (!) such that C i (q; !) is strictly increasing for q 2 [0; Q i (!)], and " ‡at":
C i (q; !) = C i (Q i (!); !), for q 2 [Q i (!); 1). All of our results extend to the case with variable production costs, simply by substituting C i (¢; !) for R i (¢; !), with the exception of part (25) Then (48) implies that under expectation damages, the …rst best investment levels cannot be achieved with advance purchase contracts where the buyer bears the variable production costs.
Speci…cally, Theorem 2 holds when we substitute assumption (48) for (28) and substitute
for condition (iv).
